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THE BAN HAS LIFTED:
NOW IS THE TIME TO CHANGE
THE ACCREDITED-INVESTOR STANDARD
Larissa Lee*
I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2013, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission lifted an
eighty-year ban on general solicitation and general advertising for certain private
securities offerings. 1 This was part of a mandate from the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act 2 (JOBS Act) in an effort to help small and emerging companies grow.
Before, private companies had to rely on private connections or hire an investment
bank with those connections in order to raise capital. Now, these companies may
solicit or advertise securities through the mail, phone, and Internet, but only when
they are selling to accredited investors. This new rule does not replace the old rule,
which allowed a portion of the investors to be unaccredited. Rather, the new rule
adds to the old rule.
The problem with the current accredited-investor standard is that it considers
only wealth in determining whether a person may invest. These exempted
securities are typically high risk, and because the standard does not take into
account investor sophistication or cap the investment amount, it is possible for
unsophisticated, inexperienced investors to lose everything on one bad investment.
Lifting the general advertising ban creates a risk of financial harm and fraud by
allowing issuers to target unsophisticated investors who need protection, including
the elderly.
To ameliorate these potential harms, this Note proposes a new accreditedinvestor standard involving a mixture of wealth, financial sophistication, and
diversification considerations. Additionally, companies should be required to
disclose certain information, including the amount of risk and the fact that the
securities are unregistered, before they solicit or sell their securities. Finally,
investors should not be allowed to invest all of their income or net worth into one
investment; rather, investors should only be allowed to invest a certain percentage
* © 2014, Larissa Lee, J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College
of Law. I would like to thank Professors Bill Richards and Jeff Schwartz for their ideas and
assistance with this Note. I would also like to thank Karen Martinez for her edits and
insights. Finally, I am tremendously grateful for the hard work and input from the Utah
Law Review staff.
1
See Press Release, SEC Approves JOBS Act Requirement to Lift General
Solicitation Ban (July 10, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detai
l/PressRelease/1370539707782#.UmRxVxbnXCE.
2
Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
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to ensure that if the securities fail or are fraudulent, investors will not lose all of
their wealth at once.
Part II of this Note explores the history and purpose of the advertising ban.
Part III explains the problems with the advertising ban and its effect on emerging
companies. Part IV discusses the JOBS Act and the circumstances leading up to
the removal of the ban. Parts V and VI explore the implications of the ban’s
removal for companies and investors, respectively. Part VII highlights the issues of
the accredited-investor standard and outlines a model for a new standard.
II. BACKGROUND
At the height of the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt took
office with an ambitious plan to regulate the banking industry. 3 This plan led to the
creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). 4 Additionally, Congress passed the first federal
legislation regulating securities, known as the Securities Act of 1933 (“Act”). 5
The purpose of the Act is to ensure investors have the information they need
to make an informed decision regarding the purchase of securities and to prohibit
fraud and other misrepresentations in connection with the offer or sale of
securities. 6 Congress charged the SEC with accomplishing these goals. 7 The SEC,
therefore, requires “issuers” of stock—individuals or businesses wishing to offer or
sell stock—to register their securities and make a number of disclosures. 8 The
Act’s registration requirement extends to all offers or sales of securities unless an
exemption applies. Regulation D of the Act lays out several registration
exemptions for private offerings, found in Rules 504, 505, and 506. 9 These
3

See, e.g., New Deal Achievements, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AM. HERITAGE CTR.
MUSEUM, http://www.fdrheritage.org/new_deal.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2014) (covering
several of the finance-related reform initiatives President Roosevelt signed into law during
the early days of the New Deal, including the Emergency Banking Act and the creation of
the FDIC and SEC).
4
Id.
5
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77r (2012).
6
The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://
www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
7
See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77r.
8
Id. § 77e(a)–(c).
9
See 15 U.S.C. § 77d; 17 C.F.R. § 230.504–.506 (2012). Rule 504 allows a company
to offer unregistered securities worth up to $1 million to an unlimited number of investors
in any twelve-month period. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504. Rule 505 allows a company to offer
unregistered securities worth up to $5 million to an unlimited number of accredited
investors and up to thirty-five unaccredited investors in any twelve-month period. See id.
§§ 230.501(e)(1)(iv), 230.505(b)(2)(ii). In 1996, Congress passed the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) that preempted state registration requirements for
offerings that were exempt under federal law. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012)); see also William K. Sjostrom, Jr.,
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exemptions include the prohibition on general advertising and solicitation. The
JOBS Act, however, only affected Rule 506 by removing the ban on general
advertising and solicitation. 10
A. Rule 506 Before the JOBS Act
Rule 506 is considered a “safe harbor” exemption: it allows private companies
to raise an unlimited amount of capital without having to register the securities. 11
This exemption is subject to several restrictions. Importantly, the securities must
be sold to accredited investors. 12 Accredited investors are those whose net worth
exceeds $1 million excluding the value of a primary residence or those whose
annual income exceeded $200,000 in the past two years, with the expectation that
the income will increase or stay the same in the current year. 13 Prior to the JOBS
Act, Rule 506 allowed a company to sell securities to up to thirty-five nonaccredited investors so long as the investors are “sophisticated.” 14 Sophisticated
investors are those who have “sufficient knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters to make them capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
prospective investment.” 15
While companies are saved from the time and expense of registering, they
must still complete a Form D after the securities are sold. 16 Additionally, the
securities sold under this exemption are “restricted,” meaning they may not be
resold within one year unless registered. 17 Finally, the rule banned general
advertising and general solicitation. 18

Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow General Solicitation and Advertising in Exempt
Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2004).
10
Congress also lifted the general advertising ban placed on Rule 144A regarding the
resale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77d. Rule 144A is not part of Regulation D and deals with
“qualified institutional buyers,” not accredited investors, and is, therefore, beyond the
scope of this Note.
11
Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answer
s/rule506.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
12
Id.
13
Fact Sheet: Eliminating the Prohibition on General Solicitation and General
Advertising in Certain Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 10, 2013), http://www.
sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-124-item1.htm.
14
Rule 506 of Regulation D, supra note 11.
15
Id.
16
17 C.F.R. § 239.500 (2012).
17
Rule 506 of Regulation D, supra note 11.
18
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c).
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B. Definition of General Advertising
Rule 502(c) of Regulation D contains the limitations on general advertising
and general solicitation. 19 While neither term is actually defined in the statute, it
does offer the following examples:
(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication
published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or
broadcast over television or radio; and
(2) Any seminar or meeting whose attendees have been invited by any
general solicitation or general advertising. 20
These examples clarify the means of general advertising—newspaper,
magazine, television ads—but not the method or conduct that actually constitutes
general advertising. Is it the number of persons solicited or the type of persons
solicited? As it turns out, it could be either. It depends on the facts and
circumstances of the individual case. 21 The SEC’s main focus is on the
relationship between the issuer and the investor. 22 Where the issuer has a
preexisting relationship with the investor, it is unlikely that a general solicitation
has occurred. 23
Courts have also found that the preexisting-relationship standard may allow a
company to claim an exemption because “if there is some special, close
relationship between the offerees and the issuer, then there may be access to the
sort of information that registration would disclose.” 24 Put differently, if there is a
preexisting relationship between the issuer and the investor, it is likely the investor
knows enough about the investment to make an informed decision. And an
investor who makes an informed decision is less likely to fall victim to fraud.
If a business personally lacks the preexisting relationships necessary to obtain
funding, it is not completely out of luck. Any existing clients of an investment
bank are considered preexisting relationships for purposes of satisfying Rule 506. 25
These banks can “rent their preexisting, substantive relationships to companies

19

Id.
Id.
21
See Interpretive Release on Regulation D, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,045, 10,049 (Mar. 3,
1983).
22
See id.
23
See Woodtrails—Seattle, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, [1982–1983 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,342 (Aug. 9, 1982), available at 1982 WL 29366.
24
Mark v. FSC Sec. Corp., 870 F.2d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953)).
25
See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL
55679 (Dec. 3, 1985); H. B. Shaine & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 107907
(May 1, 1987).
20
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seeking private equity.” 26 The bank will typically charge a commission of up to
10% of the offering. 27 Many times these banks will also take a grant of common
stock in the company. 28
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE BAN: HARM TO EMERGING COMPANIES
The general advertising ban was felt most deeply on new and emerging
ventures. 29 Well-established companies either were able to afford the time and
expense of going public 30 or had the connections through preexisting relationships
or investment banks to privately sell securities. 31 President Barack Obama said at
the signing of the JOBS Act:
[B]ecause we’re still recovering from one of the worst recessions in our
history, the last few years have been pretty tough on entrepreneurs.
Credit’s been tight, and no matter how good their ideas are, if an
entrepreneur can’t get a loan from a bank or backing from investors, it’s
almost impossible to get their businesses off the ground. 32
Although the general solicitation ban initially helped in reducing fraud at the time
of its passage in 1933, the ban ultimately “had unintended consequences that hurt
honest everyday small business owners and entrepreneurs, restricting them in their
efforts to attract potential investors and critical seed and growth capital.”33 Even
the SEC noted that the ban on general advertising “hampers the utility of the
exemption and may raise the costs to companies of trying to do these exempt

26

Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 9, at 15.
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 14 (arguing that new ventures “must either (1) have preexisting relationships
with a large number of accredited investors or (2) know or hire someone who does.
Otherwise, an emerging company is left with the very difficult task of attracting buyers to a
product, that is, its securities, without advertising”).
30
See Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing
Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 7–10
(2007) (“For most small businesses, the decision whether to ‘go public’ is, realistically,
more theoretical than anything else.”).
31
See id. at 6 (“[I]t is easier for a medium-sized company to raise $50 million than for
a small company to raise $500,000.”); Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 9, at 3.
32
Remarks on Signing the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, 2012 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1 (Apr. 5, 2012).
33
Chance Barnett, The Crowdfunder’s Guide to General Solicitation and Title II of
the JOBS Act, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebar
nett/2013/09/23/the-crowdfunders-guide-to-general-solicitation-title-ii-of-the-jobs-act/.
27
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offerings.” 34 In some cases, the costs were prohibitive and excluded companies
from getting the funding they needed, resulting in the failure of many ventures. 35
IV. LIFTING THE BAN: THE JOBS ACT AND SEC ADOPTION
A. JOBS Act of 2012
In late 2011, Congress began considering legislation aimed at ameliorating the
plight of the small business. This was a particularly important focus at the time:
strengthening small businesses would help boost the economy out of recession, as
“nearly all net job creation in the United States occurred in firms less than five
years old [from 1980–2005].” 36 As outlined above, new ventures are the most
likely to benefit from the revocation of the general advertising ban. On the Senate
floor, Senator John Tester stated:
The role of startups in creating jobs and driving innovation has been well
documented, but that ability to create jobs is limited if these firms do not
have access to financing to scale and to grow their companies. So central
to job creation is making sure investors and capital markets are
accessible for startups. 37
The bill moved quickly through the House and the Senate and passed both
overwhelmingly “[i]n a rare moment of bipartisanship.” 38 Title II of the JOBS Act,
entitled Access to Capital for Job Creators, was signed into law in April 2012. 39
Under this Act, Congress required the SEC to revise Rule 506 “to provide that the
prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising . . . shall not apply to
offers and sales of securities made pursuant to [Rule 506].” 40 The Act also added
34

Exemption for Certain California Limited Issues, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,638, 35,641
(proposed July 10, 1995) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230) (discussing public comments
on whether to eliminate the ban).
35
Gregory C. Yadley, General Solicitation: Looking for Funds in All the Wrong
Places, 70 FLA. B.J. 80, 82 (June 1996) (“Adequate investment capital is necessary to
continuing American competitiveness in an increasingly global marketplace. Access to that
capital by business, particularly small entrepreneurial businesses, is unduly hampered by
current restrictions of the use of general solicitation and general advertising.”).
36
DANE STANGLER & ROBERT E. LITAN, WHERE WILL THE JOBS COME FROM? 2
(2009), http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20c
overs/2009/11/where_will_the_jobs_come_from.pdf.
37
158 CONG. REC. S1885 (2012) (statement of Sen. John Tester).
38
Jennifer Liberto, House Passes Bipartisan Bill Aimed at Start-Ups, CNN MONEY
(Mar. 8, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/08/smallbusiness/House-startup-b
ill/index.htm?hpt=hp_t1.
39
Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306, 313–15 (2012).
40
Id. § 201(a)(1). In section 201(a)(2), Congress also lifted the general advertising
ban placed on rule 144A regarding the resale of securities. This section does not deal with
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section 4(b) to the Securities Act to clarify that securities sold under Rule 506
“shall not be deemed public offerings . . . as a result of general advertising or
general solicitation.” 41
Congress then limited the scope of the ban removal by requiring that “all
purchasers of the securities [be] accredited investors.” 42 Before the Act, companies
could sell securities under Rule 506 to up to thirty-five non-accredited, but
sophisticated, investors. 43 Finally, the Act “require[s] the issuer to take reasonable
steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited investors, using such
methods as determined by the Commission.” 44 With removing the ban on general
advertising and general solicitation, along with the new restrictions on Rule 506,
companies must ensure “diligence in ascertaining the accredited investor status of
offerees in those offerings.” 45
At the signing of this bill, President Obama called the JOBS Act a “game
changer,” because it allows “startups and small business[es to] . . . have access to a
big new pool of potential investors, namely, the American people.” 46
B. The SEC Lifts the Ban
In 2011, Meredith Cross, the Director of the Division of Corporation Finance
of the SEC, spoke about the potential of lifting the ban on general solicitation. She
said that before the ban is lifted,
the staff wants to be confident that, if the ban is eliminated and private
offerings are allowed through publicity and advertising, the group to
whom the securities are sold is the group that does not need the
protection of the federal securities laws and that they are, in fact,
accredited investors. If they do not need protection, it may make sense to
make it easier to reach them . . . . 47
In August 2012, four months after the JOBS Act passed, the SEC “proposed a rule
that would remove the general solicitation ban in certain Rule 506 offerings in
accredited investors, but “qualified institutional buyers,” and is, therefore, beyond the
scope of this Note.
41
15 U.S.C. § 77d(b) (2012).
42
Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1).
43
Supra Part II.
44
Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1). The SEC clarified what “reasonable steps”
means, and this information is outlined in Part IV.C, infra.
45
James E. Bitter & Todd B. Skelton, Reforms for Hire: The Jobs Act Legislation, 14
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 13, 19–20 (2012).
46
Remarks on Signing the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, supra note 32, at 1.
47
James Hamilton, SEC Officials Discuss General Solicitation Ban and 500Shareholder Limit at House Hearing, SEC NO-ACTION LETTER WEEKLY (CCH), June 13,
2011, available at 2013 WL 48312.
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which sales would be limited to accredited investors and issuers would be required
to take reasonable steps to verify such accredited status.” 48 The SEC then
submitted the proposed rule for public comments, 49 which would have required
companies to file notice at least fifteen days before any general advertising or
solicitation occurred. 50 The rules in effect before the JOBS Act only required a
company to file the notice fifteen days after the first sale of securities. 51 The
proposed rule also required additional information to be filed on the Form D, as
well as disqualification from the use of the exemption for a period of one year if
the issuer did not comply with the filing requirements at the securities offering. 52
The SEC did not adopt the final rule until almost a year later in July 2013, and
the rule did not take effect until September 23, 2013. 53 The final rule does not
require the predisclosure requirement or the additional information, but these
considerations have been submitted for public comment as a proposed
amendment. 54 The final rule adds a new checkbox to Form D so that companies
may indicate they are relying on the general advertising exemption, 55 and it
prohibits felons and other “bad actors” from participating in a Rule 506 offering. 56
In addition, as detailed below, the SEC has provided further guidance on what
Congress intended to be “reasonable steps” to ensure investor accreditation.
C. Definition of “Reasonable Steps”
Congress tasked the SEC with the job of clarifying what “reasonable steps”
issuers of securities must take to ensure that a potential investor is actually
accredited. 57 Before the Act, it was fairly easy for an issuer to determine that an
48

Fact Sheet: Proposing Amendments to Private Offering Rules, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (July 10, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-124-item3.htm.
49
Public Comments on SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under the JOBS Act, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (June 25, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/jobsactcomments.shtml.
50
Fact Sheet: Proposing Amendments to Private Offering Rules, supra note 48.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-9415,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-69959, [2013 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
80,321, (July 10, 2013) [hereinafter Rule 506 Amendments], available at 2013 WL
5823910.
54
See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release
No. 9416, Exchange Act Release No. 34-69960, Investment Company Act Release No. IC30595, 2013 WL 4413723, at *9 (July 10, 2013).
55
Rule 506 Amendments, [2013 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 80,321.
56
Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 Offerings,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-9414 (July 10, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/2013/33-9414.pdf.
57
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a), 126 Stat. 306,
313–14 (2012).
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investor was accredited; for the most part, the issuer only had to ask the investor to
sign a paper in which the investor declared he was accredited. 58 When the SEC
released its proposed rule, it “stated its belief that promulgating specific methods
for determining accredited investor status would be impractical and potentially
ineffective in light of the wide range of verification issues that may arise in
connection with a particular offering.” 59 In its final rule, the SEC announced four
possible “reasonable steps” to ensure accreditation.60
First, to determine whether the investor meets the annual income requirement,
the issuer must obtain an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) form showing the past
two years of income, along with “the potential investor’s written statement that the
current year’s income will also meet the threshold.” 61
Second, in determining the net worth of the potential investor, the issuer may
use bank, brokerage, or other securities holdings statements; certificates of deposit;
tax assessments; and appraisal reports. 62 The issuer may then “rely on a credit
report for liabilities. The potential investor would have to declare in writing that all
liabilities have been disclosed.” 63
Third, an issuer may “rely on written confirmation from a registered brokerdealer, an SEC-registered investment advisor, a licensed attorney, or a certified
public accountant that it has verified the purchaser’s status within the last three
months.” 64 This list is not exclusive; it is possible that other parties may be able to
verify the investor’s status. 65
And finally, if an issuer has included an investor in a Rule 506 offering in the
past and that investor was accredited, then the issuer only has to require that the
investor certifies that he is still accredited. 66
Beyond these four steps, issuers are also required to “consider the nature of
the purchaser and the type of accredited investor the purchaser claims to be, the
amount and type of information available on the purchaser, and the nature of the
offering and solicitation.” 67
58

See 17 CFR § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2011) (requiring issuers to “reasonably believe”
investors are accredited).
59
James T. Carroll et al., JOBS Act: SEC Adopts Rules to Permit General Solicitation
and Advertising for Private Offerings, PERKINS COIE (July 11, 2013), http://www.perkinsco
ie.com/jobs-act--sec-adopts-rules-to-permit-general-solicitation-and-advertising-for-private
-offerings-07-10-2013/.
60
Randolph Walerius, SEC Lists Four “Reasonable Steps” to Identify Accredited
Investors Under Amended Rule 506, CQ ROLL CALL (July 10, 2013) available at 2013
CQSECRPT 0906 (Westlaw Citation).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES
It is important for companies to remember that the new rule did not replace
the old rule; it simply added another way to raise money under Rule 506(c).
Therefore, an issuer still is allowed under Rule 506(b) to continue to sell to at most
thirty-five “sophisticated” non-accredited investors, so long as no general
advertising or general solicitation is involved. 68 It is likely that during this time of
transition and uncertainty, “most startups will continue to conduct their fundraising
this way for the time being.” 69
But what about the companies that wish to advertise to the general public?
The obvious benefit and purpose of the Act is to allow new companies to reach
beyond their existing connections. Under the new rule, companies may use “tools
such as blogs, e-mail newsletters and social media” to target accredited investors
they would not have access to otherwise. 70
Although companies may solicit accredited investors, the new rule imposes
safeguards, such as the “reasonable steps” outlined above, to ensure companies
verify that these investors actually are accredited. “The SEC has clearly stated that
having an investor check a box on a questionnaire is not sufficient to verify
accredited investor status, absent additional information about the purchaser.” 71
This verification process will take time and could be quite costly. Finally, the rules
for filing a Form D are different under 506(c): a company must file within fifteen
days of receiving the first investment. 72
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTORS
Before the ban was lifted, the North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA) 73 found that the most frequent investigative and enforce68

17 CFR § 230.506(b) (2011).
SEC Lifts Ban on General Solicitation in Certain Private Placements: What Does It
Mean for Entrepreneurs?, COOLEY LLP (July 16, 2013), http://www.cooley.com/SEC-liftsban-on-general-solicitations-in-certain-private-placements-what-it-means-for-entrepreneurs.
70
Id.
71
Id. For examples of cases where investors merely signed a paper saying they were
accredited, see United States v. DeSantis, 134 F.3d 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1998); Wright v.
Nat’l Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256, 260–61 (6th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the argument that
plaintiffs were not accredited because plaintiffs warranted in the subscription agreement
that they were accredited); and Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Woodhead,
917 F.2d 752, 754 (2d Cir. 1990).
72
Tanya Prive, General Solicitation Ban Lifted Today—Three Things You Must Know
About It, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/201
3/09/23/general-solicitation-ban-lifted-today-three-things-you-must-about-it/.
73
NASAA is the “oldest international organization devoted to investor protection.”
About Us, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 7,
2014). All fifty states are members of this organization. Id. Its purpose is to create
resolutions and model rules to protect “main-street” investors—everyday, average investors
69
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ment action by state securities regulators was “[f]raudulent private placement
offerings.” 74 Because these investments are “highly illiquid, generally lack
transparency and have little regulatory oversight[,] . . . they carry high risk and
may not be suitable for many individual investors.” 75
NASAA argued that the JOBS Act would only exacerbate what was already
the most significant concern of the states, due to the fact that states are preempted
from requiring registration of securities exempted by Regulation D. 76 NASAA
warned that the JOBS Act would bring Rule 506 offerings to “social media,
billboards, or t-shirts on window washers as one startup has proposed.” 77
State securities regulators across the nation are also apprehensive about the
change in Rule 506. These regulators believe that the “integrity of the market” is at
risk by allowing “small, speculative companies and high-risk hedge funds to raise
money through public advertising.” 78 The state securities commissioner of
Arkansas said, “You can’t just open the door of a new way of offering securities
without ensuring the integrity of the market . . . [a]nd the idea that the accredited
investor is a sophisticated investor is ridiculous.” 79
Conversely, many scholars, politicians, and business people have argued that
the risks of lifting the general advertising ban are outweighed by the benefits.
Professor William K. Sjostrom Jr. argued in 2004 that:
While the ban may help prevent securities fraud, it has a much greater
impact on the ability of an honest, legitimate company to attract investors
since, in light of the ban, such a company will not engage in any general

—at the state and federal level. Regulatory and Legal Activity, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N,
http://www.nasaa.org/regulatory-activity/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2014). NASAA also works
with the federal government to ensure coordination and standardization of rules. Id.
74
NASAA Expands Annual Top Investor Threat List: JOBS Act Implementation
Prompts Additions of Threats to Small Business Owners, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N (Oct.
15, 2013), http://www.nasaa.org/27012/nasaa-expands-annual-top-investor-threats-list/.
75
Id.
76
Id. (“[S]cam artists are likely to use this legally permissible avenue to their
advantage leading, no doubt, to another year of Rule 506 offerings holding the top spot as
the most frequent source of state securities enforcement actions.”); The Jobs Act: An
Investor Protection Disaster Waiting to Happen, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N (Mar. 22,
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solicitation or advertising, whereas someone willing to perpetrate
securities fraud likely is not troubled in the least by violating the ban.80
Sjostrom additionally argued that while the ban should be lifted, it should be
limited to emerging companies who need the access to capital the most and make
considerable contributions to the economy. 81 He argued that this would allow
access to emerging companies to “latent angel investors”—those who are ready
and willing to invest in these private placement offerings but cannot be accessed
through the traditional route and, therefore, may only be found through general
advertising. 82 Finally, Sjostrom wanted to limit these offerings through registered
broker-dealers or certain persons associated with the issuer.83
VII. CHANGING THE ACCREDITED-INVESTOR STANDARD
This section defines what it means to be an accredited investor, which
currently is solely a wealth-based standard. In doing so, it argues that this standard
is an insufficient evaluator of qualified investors because it fails to take into
account investor sophistication and other factors, such as age and disability. These
considerations show that the SEC may be ignoring those investors that are most
likely to suffer serious financial harm. Therefore, this section proposes a model for
a new accredited-investor standard that takes into account investor financial
sophistication, places a limit on the percentage of net worth/annual income that
may be invested in any one exempted security, and requires upfront disclosures
from the issuer. Finally, this model proposes lowering the wealth threshold in
order to allow financially sophisticated investors to participate.
A. Definition of Accredited Investor
As introduced in Part II.B above, an accredited investor is defined as someone
who either has (1) a net worth of at least $1 million at the time the purchase is
made (either individually or joint net worth with a spouse) or (2) an annual income
of at least $200,000 for each of the past two years or a joint income of at least
$300,000 during that same period, and a “reasonable expectation” that income will
remain the same or increase in the current year. 84
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Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 9, at 42.
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This rule was amended in 2010 with the Dodd-Frank Act. 85 Dodd-Frank
prohibited considering a person’s primary residence in the calculation of net worth.
It is estimated that this standard “limit[s] equity investment in private companies to
approximately 2 percent of the American population.” 86 Dodd-Frank also “requires
the SEC to periodically review this accredited investor standard every four years
and make adjustments ‘as the Commission may deem appropriate for the
protection of investors, in the public interest, and in light of the economy.’” 87 The
standard was adopted in an effort to ensure that those who need the protection of
the securities laws the most are covered, and those who do not may take high risks
with the potential of high returns. 88 The SEC explained that its “considerable
regulatory experience with the use of the term ‘accredited investor’ leads us to
believe it strikes the appropriate balance between the necessity for investor
protection and meaningful relief for issuers offering securities, especially small
businesses.” 89
B. Why the Accredited-Investor Standard Is Insufficient at Protecting Investors
There are several disadvantages to using the accredited-investor standard as a
way of weeding out potential investors who need the protection of the securities
laws. First, the greatest weakness of this standard is that it does not take into
account an investor’s financial sophistication, only the amount of wealth an
investor has accumulated. A second issue is the confusion this standard has
produced over whether investors need to be accredited or sophisticated, especially
since courts use the two terms interchangeably even though they are different
standards for different purposes. Finally, the groups that are most likely to suffer
irreparable financial harm from this standard are those most likely to benefit from
investor protection, such as the elderly.
1. The Standard Does Not Consider Investor Sophistication
The accredited-investor standard does not consider financial sophistication.
The focus of the standard is merely on net worth or annual income, with no inquiry
into the knowledge a potential investor may have regarding securities, risk, or the
85

See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
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uffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/2013/02/soe%20report_2013pdf.pdf.
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49, 51 n.3 (2012) (quoting the Dodd-Frank Act).
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Defining the Term “Qualified Purchaser” Under the Securities Act of 1933, 66 Fed.
Reg. 66,839, 66,840 (proposed Dec. 27, 2001) (to be codified at 17 CFR pt. 230).

382

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

particular transaction. 90 Therefore, someone with money and absolutely no
experience in the financial industry may now invest in very high risk private
offerings. Conversely, a professor from a typical university with a doctoral degree
in finance will most likely not be accredited and yet is clearly aware of the risks of
investing in a new venture.
Another issue with basing the standard on net worth or annual income is the
possibility that the “net worth computation [is based] on liberally appraised illiquid
assets or on the assets of a spouse. An investor accredited solely by income . . .
may actually be insolvent at the time of purchase.” 91 The standard also fails to
consider diversification: an investor with a net worth of $1 million could
potentially invest all of that money with one company and lose all of her life
savings at once. These criteria are incomplete indicators of whether an “investor is
able to bear the risk of losing the invested funds.” 92
Rather than looking at an investor’s involvement in the finance industry, the
SEC regulation “relies on the status of individual investors . . . to determine
whether substantial regulation is necessary.” 93 To justify its standard, the SEC
reasons that “wealthy investors are always sophisticated or that they, no matter
how naive, do not need the protection of the 1933 Act’s registration provisions.” 94
But this assumption is flawed because it views an investor as black or white—
either deserving of the SEC’s protections or not. In reality, “[i]nvestors possess
vastly different degrees of financial sophistication. Some are institutional investors
or professionals with vast resources, educations from top business schools, and
substantial investment experience. Others are individuals with few resources, little
or no education, and even less experience in the securities markets.” 95 There is a
wide spectrum of sophistication and wealth, and the two do not always go hand in
hand.
The Bernie Madoff scandal is an excellent example of the inadequacy of the
accredited-investor standard. Madoff ran a well-known investment advisory
business and was also a former NASDAQ chairman. 96 He headed a popular hedge
fund where investors “clamored to be in [the fund] because of the stability of
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double-digit returns and the reports of serious wealth creation.” 97 This hedge fund
was one of the largest Ponzi schemes in history, however. 98 Investors lost over $20
billion in this scheme. 99 Many of the investors were wealthy or institutional
investors, but most had “little to no financial acumen . . . [and lost] their entire
fortunes to Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.” 100
Of course, the wealthy are better able to afford assistance with their finances,
including the use of broker-dealers. Hiring someone who is financially savvy may
make up for investors’ lack of sophistication. Yet, there are two main issues with
this argument: investor overconfidence and other biases. A 2007 study from
Princeton University 101 showed that investors tend to be overconfident in looking
at future earnings:
People tend to be unrealistically optimistic about their future financial
wealth. As a consequence, they often fail to save enough for retirement,
and they make investment choices that are riskier than they can afford.
As a result of this bias, people often are not well-prepared for retirement
or other future financial endeavors. 102
Investors are also subject to several other biases. These biases include the
“Blind Spot,” where investors may be able to see others’ biases or influences on
judgment but are unable to see their own. 103 Another bias is the “Halo Effect,”
where investors tend to see certain people in a more positive light, without actually
knowing whether they are “deserving of such positive judgment.” 104 The study
showed that this bias “could be damaging, if it led people to overlook the
importance of getting a background check on a broker before investing, and if it
led people to invest more money than they should.” 105 Therefore, through a
combination of investor overconfidence and bias, it is unlikely that the ability to
hire someone financially savvy actually makes up for a lack of financial
sophistication.
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2. Mistaken Assumptions About “Accredited” and “Sophisticated” Investors
A major issue with the accredited-investor standard is the assumption that
accredited and sophisticated investors are one in the same. A sophisticated investor
is defined as one who has “sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters to [be] capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
prospective investment.” 106 Courts may also take into account several factors to
determine investor sophistication, such as “wealth[,] . . . age, education,
professional status, investment experience, and business background.” 107
Judges often have delivered opinions expressing the idea that because an
investor is accredited, he must be financially savvy. 108 One judge found that
because the investor was “an accredited investor under the Federal Securities
laws[,] . . . he certainly ha[d] some ‘sophistication and expertise . . . in financial
and securities matters.’” 109 It does not necessarily follow, however, that because an
investor meets certain monetary standards, he must have “sophistication and
expertise” in finance.
A Seventh Circuit opinion found in another context that certain contract
participants were the “equivalent of ‘accredited investors’ in securities markets:
wealthy persons who can look out for themselves.” 110 One financial professional
found that “often people whose net worth puts them in the accredited category . . .
may be smart and successful in their fields, but most are confused about the basics
of investing and managing money.” 111
The upshot is that a wealthy investor is not always a sophisticated investor.
Conflating the accredited standard with the sophisticated standard can harm
investors who need and warrant the protection of federal securities laws. As Justice
William O. Douglas famously dissented, “[t]he [Securities] Act does not speak in
terms of ‘sophisticated’ as opposed to ‘unsophisticated’ people dealing in
securities. The rules when the giants play are the same as when the pygmies enter
the market.” 112
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3. The Accredited-Investor Standard Harms the Elderly and Others Most in Need
of Protection
As outlined in Part VII.A, the accredited-investor standard does not always
equate to actual wealth and the ability to take significant financial risk. 113 “[T]he
categories of ‘wealthy’ investors frequently include the widows and orphans whose
protection traditionally has been the sacred trust of the SEC. . . . [They] often do
not have the sophistication to demand access to material information or otherwise
to evaluate the merits and risks of a prospective investment.” 114
In some circumstances, a person may have a net worth of $1 million, but this
could be due to an insurance settlement or a retirement account that has vested. A
million dollars may seem like a lot of money—until you consider the fact that a
person may need to live off of that money for twenty years or more. Taking into
account inflation, that money is even less. At an advanced stage in life, that money
is even harder to earn back once it is lost. At the state level, scams involving abuse
of the elderly constitute about one in six enforcement actions. 115 “Given the
financial threshold for an accredited investor, . . . elderly people, who may even
suffer from mental illness, are prime targets for companies looking for
investors.” 116
SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar—the sole dissenting vote in the adoption of
the new rules lifting the ban on general advertising—pointed out the major error
with the assumption that accredited investors are “knowledgeable about financial
matters and otherwise able to fend for themselves.” 117 As outlined above, being
accredited does not equal being financially sophisticated. In fact, “only a small
percentage of U.S. households meeting the definition of accredited investor have
substantial direct holdings of individual securities, suggesting that their experience
investing in securities may be limited.” 118 Aguilar asserts that elderly investors will
not be protected for being accredited, “but in fact made more vulnerable because of
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it.” 119 It may be difficult for even moderately sophisticated investors to understand
the risks involved in unregistered securities, but elderly investors with no financial
literacy are the most at risk.
C. A Model for a New Standard
Lifting the ban on general advertising has some potential advantages. It is
easier than ever for companies to tap into latent investors who are willing to invest
but lack the personal connections. This benefits companies seeking to access
funding, investors, and on a larger scale, the economy. However, along with the
removal of the ban, the accredited-investor standard should change. Otherwise,
private-placement exemptions under Rule 506, which already are the number one
source of fraudulent transactions, will only become riskier. This will undermine
any efforts to improve the relationship between buyers and sellers. And the
decrease in consumer confidence will harm the economy.
Therefore, this Note proposes a new standard for accrediting investors. This
standard is a hybrid of the accredited and sophisticated standards. The components
of this standard include, most importantly, an inquiry into financial sophistication,
a lower floor requirement for wealth, a diversification requirement, and upfront
disclosures. Each will be discussed in turn.
(1) Financial Sophistication. In addition to verifying wealth, an investor
must also be financially sophisticated. This could be determined by a variety of
factors, including financial education, experience in the finance industry, or
possibly a test or certification that can be taken to prove financial sophistication. 120
A combination of these factors may also be enough. An exception to this rule
would be if an investor lacks the mental capacity to act on his own behalf but has a
sophisticated guardian/custodian who makes all financial decisions on behalf of the
investor.
(2) Wealth Verification. This model would use an income and net worth
verification system similar to the standard used today, but would allow for a lower
floor requirement (e.g., $500,000 net worth or $100,000 annual income). This
allows for very sophisticated investors, who may not be as wealthy, to participate
in private offerings. Similar to today’s rule, primary residence or any loans secured
by the residence should not be included in net-wealth calculations. 121 It could also
119
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be worthwhile to exclude IRAs and other retirement plan balances from net worth
calculations of individuals close to retirement, who would otherwise be unable to
re-create those investments if their savings were lost.
(3) Diversification. The idea behind this requirement is that a person should
not put all of his eggs in one basket. If an investor wants to invest in unregistered
securities, he should only be allowed to invest a certain percentage of his income
or net worth to ensure that if the securities fail or are fraudulent, the investor will
not lose all of his savings. For example, if an investor has $1 million in net worth,
he should not be able to invest more than 10% or $100,000 with any one issuer.
This will protect the elderly or those who are not easily able to regain wealth if all
is lost. 122
(4) Upfront Disclosures. Rather than requiring companies to file a Form D
after the securities are sold, the proposed standard would require it to be filed up
front (similar to the proposed amendment offered by the SEC). In addition to the
Form D, companies would be required to deliver potential investors a private
placement memorandum (PPM) before purchasing any securities, informing the
investor that they are involved in a private offering under an exemption, that the
risk is very high, and that it is possible for the investor to lose all of her money. 123
This disclosure must be signed by both the investor and the issuer.
There are, of course, several disadvantages to this proposed standard. The
standard is more nuanced and less straightforward than the current standard that
only measures wealth. Because it is more complex, it may expose an issuer to a
greater amount of risk in attempting to comply with the standard and, therefore,
would cost more money to ensure compliance. The wealth standard may be
determined easily by looking at IRS documents or bank statements, whereas the
proposed standard would require all that in addition to verifying the investor’s
sophistication and providing documents up front. By the time it came time to
actually invest, many investors may be scared off or will have moved to other less

artificially inflate net worth under the new definition by borrowing against home equity
shortly before participating in an exempt securities offering”); supra Part VII.A.
122
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risky investments. But that is the point—private-placement offerings are not for the
weak of heart or the risk-averse investors. These investments are riddled with risk
but also the potential of high returns, and there is certainly a sector of the
population willing to take those risks. It is a matter of ensuring the right investors
are paired with the right issuers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Lifting the ban on general advertising and general solicitation will ultimately
change how emerging companies receive funding. With greater access to
previously untapped investors, more new businesses will be able to get on their
feet and be successful. This success depends on the regulation of these offerings to
ensure they are free of fraud and that investors maintain confidence in the market.
As the standard currently stands, it is likely that the removal of the ban will
result in a regulatory gap, which may take advantage of several investors. The
accredited investor standard should be changed to reflect not only individual
wealth, but also financial sophistication. It should require disclosure of the risks up
front and a diversification requirement. This will ensure a “meeting of the minds”
between the issuer and the investor and produce a more stable market for privateplacement offerings.

